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We analyse the extent and evolution of informality and inequality in the Serbian 
labour market between 2002 and 2007, using data from the Living Standard 
Measurement Surveys (LSMS). Two surprising results emerge. First, the level of 
informal employment has risen significantly over the period, despite strong economic 
growth and the introduction of a range of market-oriented reforms. Second, the level 
of inequality in earnings seems to have remained more or less constant over the 
period, in contrast to the experience of other countries at a similar stage of transition. 
We show that informal employees earn significantly less than those in the formal 
sector, controlling for a range of other variables, and informality plays an increasingly 
important role in explaining earnings inequality. 
 
JEL classification: J3, J4, P2 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Serbian labour market has been in a state of great flux throughout the current 
decade, following the beginning of transition in late-2000 and early-2001. This paper 
examines two aspects of the labour market – informal employment and earnings 
inequality. Using nationally representative survey data from 2002 and 2007, we first 
document the degree of informality in the labour market and the amount of inequality 
in earnings, using different measures of inequality. We also see whether informality 
has declined over this period, at a time when important laws to encourage and 
simplify business registration have been introduced in Serbia. Using a regression-
based methodology, we then test whether the degree of informality in the labour 
market influences or explains the level of, and change in, earnings inequality. We also 
investigate the role of other factors that explain this phenomenon. Finally, the paper 
draws the relevant policy conclusions for labour market reform. 
 
Our results contain a number of interesting findings. Perhaps the most striking is that 
the level of informal employment has risen sharply in Serbia between 2002 and 2007. 
This is a counter-intuitive result, but can be explained by the specifics of the Serbian 
case, as discussed below. A second result of interest is that the level of inequality 
appears to have remained more or less constant over the period in question, both for 
formal earnings and in the informal sector, where inequality is particularly 
pronounced. Finally, the analysis identifies informality as an important determinant of 
inequality in 2007, but not in 2002. In addition, informal workers earn less (in 
monthly terms) than formal workers, even when we control for a range of other 
characteristics. These results all highlight the importance for the Serbian authorities of 
tackling informality and encouraging formalisation through the labour market. 
 
The structure of the paper is follows. The next section contains some background 
material on Serbia’s transition to date and on existing literature on informality and 
inequality in transition countries. The following section details a methodology that 
allows us to attribute the level and change in earnings inequality to its determining 
factors. Two subsequent sections respectively review the data used and report the 






Serbia was a latecomer to transition. Throughout the1990s Serbia’s development was 
marked by armed conflicts, international isolation, and political and economic 
instability. The collapse of the common market due to the break-up of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and subsequent international sanctions seriously 
affected the Yugoslav traded sector and led to a massive contraction of industry. 
Industrial activity fell by 50 per cent during the first half of the 1990s and per capita 
GDP plummeted to the 1969 level. Since mid-1990s real output has been increasing 
each year, with the exception of 1999 when real GDP fell by an estimated 18 per cent 
due to the Kosovo conflict and the NATO air strikes. Prior to the 1990s, living 
standards were comparatively high relative to most socialist economies. The collapse 
of economic activities and the rise in both open unemployment and underemployment 
led to an impoverishment of the population. Socio-economic conditions were also   2
exacerbated by the influx of nearly 700,000 displaced people. The reduction in 
income-generating opportunities in the formal economy and the poor enforcement of 
tax and labour regulations, coupled with mild penalties for violations, encouraged the 
growth of the informal economy, which became an important safety net for many.
4  
 
In January 2001, the new Serbian government, led by Zoran Djindjić, launched a 
sweeping reform programme aimed at accelerating the transition to a market 
economy. Since then, the economy has greatly expanded and living standards have 
improved markedly. The economic reforms centred on macroeconomic stabilisation, 
price and foreign exchange liberalisation, the restructuring of the banking system, the 
privatisation of state- and socially-owned enterprises and improvements in the 
business regulatory framework.  These reforms have stimulated capital inflows and 
led to a shift in economic activity to the private sector. There has been a sharp 
reduction in annual inflation and steady real economic growth averaging about 6 
percent per year over 2001-2006 (See, for example, EBRD, 2008). However, the ILO-
defined unemployment rate has remained stubbornly high at about 20 percent over 
2004-2007. In spite of significant progress on a number of fronts, the EBRD transition 
indicators of cumulative reform progress continue to show Serbia lagging behind 
many of its neighbours (See EBRD, 2008).  In particular, the formal labour market in 
Serbia, despite the introduction of improved legislation on labour and employment, 
remained relatively rigid over the post-2000 period and functioned poorly in contrast 
to its considerably more flexible informal counterpart (for a discussion, see World 
Bank, 2004).  As a result, informal activities are a key feature of economic life in 
Serbia, with important implications for the rest of the economy and for general 
welfare. 
 
There is a huge literature both on the informal economy and on inequality, but a rather 
limited amount applied so far to transition economies, and very little to Serbia. With 
regard to the informal economy, two recent multi-country studies that include 
estimates for transition economies are Schneider (2004) and Christie and Holzner 
(2004). Schneider’s paper provides estimates of (what the author terms) the “shadow” 
economy (relative to recorded GDP) for countries from around the world. The size of 
the shadow economy in Serbia and Montenegro (still one country at the time) is 
estimated at 39.1 per cent of measured GDP in 2002/03, up from 36.4 per cent in 
1999/2000. As the unweighted average across 25 transition countries in 2002/03 is 
40.1 per cent, Serbia and Montenegro is situated a little below the average size of this 
group. Christie and Holzner (2004) analyse a range of south-eastern Europe (SEE) 
and central eastern Europe and the Baltics (CEB) countries. They take a different 
approach from that of Schneider (2004) and focus instead on household tax 
compliance. They derive data on “true” household income (from final consumption 
data) and statutory tax rates and compare actual tax revenue with what it should be if 
everyone paid the right amount of tax. The gap gives an indication of the size of the 
shadow economy. A wider range of estimates compared to Schneider’s results are 
found, with Serbia, perhaps surprisingly, estimated at just 19 per cent of GDP. 
 
The above research on informal activity has focused on calibrating the size of the 
unmeasured sector relative to its measured counterpart. The analysis of informal 
                                                 
4 Over the 1990s, the ratio of the informal economy to registered GDP in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia was approximately one-third (see Krstić, 2002).   3
activity at the level of the labour force participant has been even more limited. Recent 
estimates according to the Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) data show 
that informal employment accounted for 30 per cent of total employment in 2002 and 
35 per cent in 2003 (Krstić, 2004).
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Rising inequality is a common feature of the transition process. Some authors have 
argued that inequality has risen further in those countries that actively pursued 
reforms (see, for example, Milanović, 1998). In contrast, recent research for Serbia 
(Krstić et al., 2007) suggests that, following a period of rising inequality in the late-
1990s, the early years of post-Milosević reform (2001-03) were in fact characterised 
by falling inequality. Recently-released LSMS data for the middle years of the present 
decade will allow us to extend this analysis to see what the latest trends are in Serbia.  
 
Most transition countries have seen a sharp rise in labour earnings inequality since the 
transition began (World Bank, 2000), driven by significant changes in the labour 
markets. Rising wage disparities had the largest impact on the increase of total income 
inequality (Milanović 1999; Mitra and Yemtsov, 2006). Factors usually cited as a 
major driving force of increased earnings inequality are increased returns to 
education, and sectoral and structural shifts in employment (towards services and less 
regulated forms of employment, e.g., temporary contracts), as well as changes in the 
institutional setting of wage bargaining (Leitner and Holzner, 2008). There is also 
empirical evidence of a significant and positive link between the level of income 
inequality and the share of the informal sector in the economy (see Rosser et al., 
2000). Rutkowski (1996) highlighted the fact that excluding the informal sector in 
transition countries where it accounts for a significant part of overall economic 
activity is likely to underestimate the actual level of earnings inequality. Recent 
research on Bosnia and Herzegovina has shown that earnings inequality is more 
pronounced in the informal economy relative to the formal economy (Krstić and 
Sanfey, 2007). This suggests that income inequality declines if informal employment 
falls as a percentage of total employment. We will test this proposition for Serbia, 
using the data and methodology described below.  
 
The examination of inequality in Serbia has attracted only modest empirical research 
since the transition started, with Milanović (2003) and Krstić  et al. (2007) being 
exceptions. Milanović (2003) explores inequality of consumption and income and the 
contribution of income sources to total income inequality, using the LSMS for 2002, 
while Krstić et al. (2007) focuses on inequality of labour market earnings, using data 





In this paper we follow the approach of Krstić  et al. (2007) in using an OLS 
regression-based approach suggested by Fields (2002) to identify the key 
determinants of the level of main job earnings inequality in Serbia for a given year, as 
well as the changes in inequality between 2002 and 2007. This approach allows the 
contribution of each regression factor to the level of earnings inequality to be 
                                                 
5 The definition of informal employment in this study covered: (1) workers employed with no social 
contributions paid; (2) people employed in a private unregistered firm; and (3) the employed who work 
at home, from door-to-door, in the flea market and in other places.   4
quantified and isolated.
6  It is relatively straightforward to implement even as the 
number of explanatory variables increases.  In addition, the framework can be easily 
extended to allow the relative influence of a change in one factor on inequality 
between two points in time to be isolated.
7 There are drawbacks to the methodology, 
but its relative simplicity compared to other, more computationally burdensome 




The methodology can be summarised as follows.
9 We start by assuming a wage 
determining function of the following form: 




ji jX β  + ui,         [ 1 ]  
where ln(·) denotes the natural logarithmic operator, Xji, j=1,…k represents wage 
determining variables (e.g., labour force experience, education, marital status, private 
sector/informal sector, industry sector, settlement, region, hours worked).  Equation 






ji jZ a  = aZ′  ,         [2] 
where a =  [β0   β1  β2  β3 ……βk   1], and Z = [1  X1i  X2i  X3i ……Xki  u]. 
The standard inequality measures, defined on the vector of wage (wi), are continuous 
and symmetric functions that equal zero when all workers receive the mean wage.  
Given the above wage determining function, we can thus define an inequality index 
on the vector of log wages as I(·) = I[ln(w1), ln(w2), ln(w3)……ln(wN)].  It can be 
shown (see Shorrocks (1982)), that the share for the j
th factor in the inequality of the 
income measure used is given by:     
Sj[w] =  
(ln(w))
   w] , Z cov[a j j
σ




   w) cor(Z ) Z σ a j j j
,       [ 3 ]  






j   [w] S = 1.0 holds for any inequality index that is continuous and symmetric. Fields 
(2002) verifies that once a log-linear model is specified, the results obtained, using 
this methodology, are not dependent on the inequality measure used.       
                                                 
6 Fields and Yoo (2000) and Ravallion and Chen (1999) provide applications of this methodology to 
Korea and rural China respectively.   
7 See Fields (2002) for a number of additional advantages the methodology possesses over the non-
regression based procedures that attempt to isolate overall inequality into its within-group and between-
group components.    
8 See Krstić et al. (2007) for further discussion. An important drawback of Wan’s approach is that the 
software allows only a limited number of variables in the regression that could be used for 
decomposition. The software allows a decomposition for a maximum of 27 variables. However, our 
OLS regression model for monthly earnings has 29 variables (see Table 5 in section 5). 
9 This discussion draws on Krstić et al. (2007).   5
In order to account for differences in inequality between two time periods (0 and 1), 
we note: 
[I(·)]1 – [I(·)]0  =  ] )] [I( S   )] [I( [S 0 j,0
1 k
1 j
1 j,1 ⋅ × − ⋅ × ∑
+
=
.      [ 4 ]  
The contribution of the j
th factor to the change in equality over the two time periods is 
given by: 
] )] [I( )] [[I(
] )] [I( S ] )] [I( S [
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This expression [5] isolates the changing factors that drive the differences in earnings 
inequality between two years.  In our research we will use the Gini, Theil entropy 




4. Data and labour market trends 
 
The data for this study are drawn from two waves of the Living Standards 
Measurement Study (LSMS) conducted in Serbia (excluding Kosovo) in May-June 
2002 and in May-June 2007. In line with standard LSMS methodology, the surveys 
collected information from households and individuals on their income and 
consumption level, economic activities, and other characteristics. The total number of 
interviewed households was 6,386 in 2002 corresponding to 17,357 individuals, and 
5,557 households (19,725 individuals) in 2007. The data are representative at the 
national level, and by regions (6 regions) and type of settlement (urban/rural).
10 
 
The earnings measure available within the LSMS is based on monthly pay in the main 
job and excludes taxes, social security contributions and any welfare payments related 
to the earnings received. We distinguish between earnings received from the formal 
economy and those from informal activities. Recent research on male labour market 
earnings inequality in Serbia (Krstić et al., 2007) based on the Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) data did not distinguish between formal and informal earnings, as the Serbian 
LFS was not designed to measure the scale of informal economy. Thus, in this study 
the LSMS data are used as it allows us to define the informal economy in a 
comparable way in 2002 and 2007, using the same definition in both cases (see Krstić, 
2004). Thus, the definition of informal employment in this study covers:  
                                                 
10 For more details on sampling methodology, see Living Standard Measurement Study: Serbia 2002-
2007, published by the Serbian Republican Statistical Office (RSO) in 2008.  
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(1) workers employed with no social contributions paid;  
(2) people employed in a private unregistered firm; and 
(3) the employed who work at home, from door-to-door, in the flea market and 
in other similar places.  
 
There is also information available in the LSMS (but not in the LFS) on earnings 
arrears. We can determine whether the earnings measure reported reflects arrears in 
the reference month. This is an important variable because it is well known that 
arrears may have an impact on earnings dispersion over time, depending on whether 
its incidence is declining or increasing. 
 
Table 1 contains the main labour market indicators in Serbia in 2002 and 2007. 
Despite the strong economic growth over this period, it is clear from Table 1 that all 
main labour indicators appear to be weaker in 2007 than five years ago. Both the 
participation and employment rates have declined by 3 and 4 percentage points 
respectively, while the unemployment rate has increased by nearly 2 percentage 
points. These data suggest that job creation in Serbia remains a challenge. The 
expansion of the private sector has failed to absorb the labour shed by the 
restructuring and privatisation processes.  
 
The table also shows the significance of employment in the informal economy in 
Serbia. Nearly 28 per cent of total employment (aged 15-64) was in the informal 
sector in 2002, and this percentage increased to 35 per cent in 2007, or even to 37 per 
cent if those who worked with a verbal, or no contract with the employer are included 
(information on the latter is available only in 2007). Among employees only (i.e. 
excluding self-employed, farmers and unpaid family workers), the share of those 
working informally increased from 11 per cent to 20 per cent over the same period. 
This rise in informal employment has come about despite the improved business 
climate over the period in question.  
 
Why has this happened? One possible reason for this unexpected result is the 
regressive character of the labour tax system that was introduced in 2001 and was in 
effect until January 2007. By imposing a high tax burden on low-income labour,
11 the 
incentives for employees to join the formal economy diminishes, as they have to give 
up a significant portion of what they can get by working at the same job informally. 
Employers also have an incentive to evade this tax, for the same reason (Arandarenko 
and Vukojević, 2008). The regressive labour tax system created disincentives for 
firms to hire low-cost labour and is likely to reduce labour demand, especially in the 
formal sector for many vulnerable groups of workers who experienced difficulties in 
finding employment (World Bank, 2006). 
 
Informal employment was until recently also encouraged by the ease in gaining access 
to a range of social benefits by the simple act of registering as unemployed with the 
employment service. The fact that many registered unemployed were in fact working 
                                                 
11 The tax wedge for low wage earner receiving 33% of average wage was 47.1%; for a worker 
receiving average wage it was 42.2%, while it was down to 34.5% for a wage eight  times higher than 
the average wage (even after accounting for annual personal income tax). 
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in the informal economy (33 per cent) and had easy access to health insurance and 
other social benefits represented a hidden subsidy to enterprises engaged in the 
informal economy (Krstić and Carbonese, 2009). Such occurrences are now ruled out; 
the employment service is no longer responsible for covering health insurance for 
jobseekers.  
 
Table 1. Main labour market indicators for Serbia, 2002-2007     
   2002  2007 
Participation rate  67.2  64.2 
Employment rate  59.3  55.3 
Unemployment rate  11.7  13.9 
Employment in informal economy (in % of total employment, 15-64)  27.6  34.9 
Note: Participation and employment rates expressed in percent of working age population (15-64) 
Source: LSMS 2002, 2007. 
  
Table 2 contains a more detailed breakdown of the two categories – formal and 
informal. Several points of interest arise. First, it seems that males, young (aged 15-
25), less educated, workers in non-wage employment, and in agriculture are more 
likely to be employed in informal than in formal activities in both years considered. 
Second, comparing the informal economy between 2002 and 2007, it appears that the 
share of older workers (aged 46-64) in the informal economy increased, as well as the 
share of better educated (having secondary education or more), self-employed and 
unpaid family workers, while the share of workers in services declined. Third, 
informal workers earn less than formal workers in both years considered, about 8 per 
cent and 43 per cent in 2002 and 2007 respectively; the gap has therefore increased 
significantly over 2002-2007. Earnings in the informal sector also tend to be more 
dispersed, as measured by the coefficient of variation for monthly earnings.  
 
Table 2. Characteristics of employment in formal and informal economy, 2002-2007 
(in %, population between 15-64) 
      2002      2007   
   Informal Formal   All  Informal Formal   All 
All  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0 
          
Gender          
Male  59.9 55.4 56.7 59.4  55.5  56.9 
Female  40.1 44.6 43.3 40.6  44.5  43.1 
          
Age categories          
15-25 15.1  7.9  9.9  10.7  7.3  8.5 
26-45 45.8  53.0  51.0  44.3  53.0  50.0 
46-64 39.1  39.1  39.1  45.0  39.7  41.5 
          
Educational level          
No school or incomplete primary  12.9  4.3  6.6  9.3  1.1  4.0 
Primary school  26.5  14.9  18.1  27.4  9.9  16.0 
Vocational or three-year secondary   24.2  21.0  21.9  18.7  16.3  17.1 
Secondary or high school  29.5  39.0  36.4  35.8  46.5  42.8 
College 4.0  8.1  7.0  3.7  9.4  7.4 
University 2.9  12.6  10.0  5.1  16.8  12.7 
          
Employment type            8
Wage-employment 60.7  91.1  85.0  49.2  88.9  75.0 
Self-employment 9.9  3.9  5.1  14.2  1.9  6.2 
Farmers 26.7  4.6  9.0  25.3  9.1  14.7 
Unpaid family workers  2.8  0.5  0.9  11.4  0.2  4.1 
          
Sector of economic activity          
Agriculture   40.8  15.5  22.6  44.5  5.8  19.3 
Industry   12.7  30.4  25.5 21.9 32.9  29.1 
Services 46.6  54.1  52.0  33.6  61.3  51.6 
          
Average monthly net main job 
earnings (in dinars)* 
8,634.3 9,425.2  9,272.8 16,246.5 24,707.0 22,495.  7
Coefficient. of variation for monthly 
net main job earnings 
1.123 0.795 0.861 0.805  0.633  0.689 
Notes: * For those who reported positive hours worked. 
Source: LSMS 2002 and 2007.  
 
5. Empirical results 
 
This section now turns to a detailed analysis of some of the questions raised in the 
introduction. Specifically we focus on two issues: earnings inequality in the formal 
and informal economy and its change; and the role of different factors that explain 
both the level of, and change in, earnings inequality. The importance of the informal 
economy as one of these factors is highlighted in a special section. 
 
5.1. Formal and informal earnings inequality  
 
Has earnings inequality risen in recent years in line with the progress in transition-
related reforms and how does earnings inequality differ between the formal and 
informal economy? Table 3 shows average monthly main job earnings in the formal 
and informal economy, along with the inequality of earnings in each sector and year, 
using a range of inequality measures. Three points stand out. First, we see that 
monthly earnings in the formal economy were higher than in the informal economy in 
2007 but not in 2002 (the same pattern is observed for hourly earnings, as shown in 
Table A1 in the Annex). Second, the change in inequality in both sectors remains 
statistically insignificant according to almost all measures of inequality employed in 
our analysis (see values of z-scores). Third, earnings inequality is significantly higher 
in both years in the informal economy relative to the formal economy. Again, this 
result holds regardless of which measure of inequality is compared. One possible 
reason for this last result is the existence of the minimum wage (set out at about 40 
per cent of the average wage), which is enforced in the formal sector but not in the 
informal sector. The other reason may be that informal economy attracts a higher 
share of poorly educated workers compared to the formal economy, as shown in Table 
2.  
 
Table 3. Monthly earnings inequality, 2002-2007     
   2002  2007  z-score, 2007 vs 2002 
Average monthly net main job earnings, in dinars  9,172.3 22,659.0   
Informal 9,370.6  16,647.5   
Formal   9,148.0  24,067.3   
Inequality measures for overall earnings        9
Theil entropy measure   0.1620  0.1720  0.533 
   st.errors  (0.0148)  (0.0115)   
Gini coefficient  0.2958  0.3147  1.500 
   st.errors  (0.0092)  (0.0087)   
Variance of logs  0.3301  0.3826  1.944 
   st.errors  (0.0155)  (0.0221)   
Inequality measures for informal earnings      
Theil entropy measure   0.2401  0.2295  -0.203 
   st.errors  (0.0397)  (0.0342)   
Gini coefficient  0.3585  0.3579  -0.020 
   st.errors  (0.0224)  (0.0213)   
Variance of logs  0.4554  0.5564  1.258 
   st.errors  (0.0463)  (0.0656)   
Inequality measures for formal earnings      
Theil entropy measure   0.1524  0.1524  0.000 
   st.errors  (0.0140)  (0.0116)   
Gini coefficient  0.2877  0.2966  0.688 
   st.errors  (0.0090)  (0.0094)   
Variance of logs  0.3147  0.3009  -0.542 
   st.errors  (0.0165)  (0.0194)   
Formal vs. informal earnings, z-score     
Theil entropy measure   -2.0863  -2.1362   
Gini coefficient  -2.9290  -2.6291   
Variance of logs  -2.8628  -3.7343    
Note: Sample relates to employees, aged 15-64 years, who reported non-zero earnings and positive 
hours worked. 
Source: LSMS 2002, 2007. 
 
Before turning to a detailed analysis of inequality using the regression-based approach 
outlined earlier, we turn to a brief examination of the nature of Serbian earnings 
inequality using the non-regression based procedure adopted by Jenkins (1995). This 
approach allows a decomposition of the inequality measures by factor (or group) 
components. Thus, the total wage inequality is decomposed into parts attributable to 
between-group and within-group inequality using the Theil entropy measure from 
Table 2. The analysis is undertaken for groups comprised of gender, labour force 
experience, educational level, marital status, industry sector, informal sector, 
settlement type, region and arrears.  Table 4 shows the detailed results.  The general 
finding is that most of the earnings inequality is explained by within group inequality. 
Regarding between-group inequality, the educational level is responsible for the 
greatest part of that inequality in both years followed by arrears and region in 2002 
and region and settlement type in 2007. It should be noted that the role of education as 
the factor most responsible for between group inequality was also observed using the 
LFS sample of male employees over 1996-2003 (Krstić et al., 2007).  
 
Table 4. Within group and between group monthly earnings inequality, 
Theil entropy measure, 2002-2007 
   2002  2007  2002  2007  2002  2007 
  
Within group 
inequality Between  group  inequality 
% between group in all 
ineq. 
Gender 0.1597  0.1712    0.0023  0.0009  1.42  0.52 
Working experience  0.1612  0.1671  0.0009  0.0049  0.53  2.85 
Education 0.1437  0.1158  0.0183  0.0563  11.32  32.71 
Marital status  0.1613  0.1617  0.0007  0.0010  0.45  0.58   10
Industries 0.1600  0.1651  0.0020  0.0069  1.23  4.01 
Informal sector  0.1620  0.1631  0.0000  0.0089  0.02  5.17 
Settlement type  0.1598  0.1608  0.0022  0.0113  1.36  6.55 
Region 0.1547  0.1578  0.0073  0.0143  4.52  8.30 
Arrears 0.1518  0.1701  0.0102  0.0019  6.29  1.12 
Source: LSMS 2002, 2007. 
 
For all groups examined, except arrears and gender, the trend over time is upwards.  
There is very little between-group earnings inequality explained by the informal 
sector in 2002 but it considerably increased in 2007.  In contrast, there is evidence of 
a potentially important role for arrears in 2002 but it declined considerably in 2007. 
 
5.2. Factors that determine the level and change in earnings inequality  
 
We now turn to identifying some key factors that determine the level of main job 
earnings in Serbia. Table 5 reports OLS estimates for the augmented Mincerian 
monthly earnings equation based on the sample of employees who reported non-zero 
earnings in their main job and are aged between 15 and 64 years. Besides the standard 
explanatory variables in the earnings regression, we also include an informal sector 
variable according to the definition of the informal economy adopted in this study 
(see section 3). The variable “wage arrears” is defined as a binary variable that takes 
the value one if received earnings are delayed by two months or more, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
The fits of the equations are satisfactory and the included regressors explain 29 per 
cent and 40 per cent of the total variation in monthly earnings in 2002 and 2007 
respectively.  The estimated coefficients for the human capital measures (the 
educational qualifications and the labour force experience variables) are generally 
well determined in both years. The estimated wage returns appear to rise 
monotonically with labour force experience in 2007 and the returns to the higher 
educational qualifications are reasonable in both years by the standards of transition 
economies (see Newell and Reilly, 1999). There is an indication that the point 
estimates for higher education significantly increased between 2002 and 2007, as 
happened in many other countries in their early years of transition.  
 
The informal sector effect is not statistically significant in 2002, but it appears highly 
significant in 2007 with informal employees earning 22 per cent less, ceteris paribus, 
relative to the formal employees. This is an important result, because it highlights the 
growing advantages of being employed formally relative to informally, and therefore 
suggests that Serbia is moving towards a more mature market economy. 
 
With regard to the estimated industry effects, workers in agriculture earn less than in 
industry, and this disadvantage of agricultural workers appear to increase in 2007. The 
estimated arrears effects are highly significant in both years. Employees with wage 
arrears experience a wage disadvantage of 31 per cent in 2002 and 36 per cent in 
2007, ceteris paribus.   
  
Location and region effects are highly significant. Residing in urban areas provides a 
premium relative to residing in a town, while employees in Belgrade and Vojvodina 
enjoy significant wage premia relative to those living in Central Serbia.  
    11
Table 5. OLS regression estimates for monthly earnings, 2002-2007     
   2002    2007    
  Coef. Std.  Err. Coef. Std.  Err. 
Male 0.215  (0.017)***  0.190  (0.018)*** 
        
Work experience       
<= 5 years work experience  -0.039  (0.031)  -0.064  (0.030)** 
5-10 years  f    f   
10-20 years  -0.050  (0.025)**  0.084  (0.028)*** 
20-30 years  -0.047  (0.025)*  0.106  (0.030)*** 
years>30 -0.006  (0.033)  0.123  (0.035)*** 
        
Educational level       
No formal education  -0.075  (0.072)  -0.105  (0.073) 
Primary f    f   
Vocational or three-year secondary school   0.093  (0.029)***  0.152  (0.030)*** 
Secondary 0.257  (0.027)***  0.290  (0.028)*** 
High school  0.388  (0.033)***  0.507  (0.040)*** 
University 0.638  (0.032)***  0.865  (0.038)*** 
        
Marital status       
Married 0.146  (0.027)***  0.055  (0.024)** 
Single f    f   
Divorced/widowed 0.140  (0.040)***  0.062  (0.042) 
        
Industry sector       
Agriculture -0.058  (0.034)*  -0.265  (0.044)*** 
Industry f    f   
Services 0.010  (0.018)  -0.005  (0.019) 
        
Informal sector  0.019  (0.031)  -0.250  (0.028)*** 
Urban 0.034  (0.018)*  0.064  (0.017)*** 
        
Region       
Belgrade 0.175  (0.024)***  0.244  (0.027)*** 
Vojvodina 0.091  (0.023)***  0.075  (0.024)*** 
Central Serbia  f    f   
West Serbia  -0.044  (0.031)  0.063  (0.027)** 
East Serbia  0.038  (0.033)  0.007  (0.030) 
South-East Serbia  -0.115  (0.027)***  -0.045  (0.030) 
        
Arrears -0.371  (0.022)***  -0.449  (0.056)*** 
Monthly hours (log)  0.181  (0.031)***  0.140  (0.021)*** 
Constant 7.591  (0.167)***  8.569  (0.115)*** 
R2 adjusted  0.288    0.402   
Sample size  4257     3795    
Notes: (a) Sample relates to employees, aged 15-64 years, who reported non-zero earnings. (b) The dependent 
variable is the log of monthly earnings.  All explanatory variables with the exception of monthly hours (logged) 
are binary variables. (c) The estimation procedure is OLS and White (1980) estimated standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. (d) The critical value for the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity at the 0.05 level is 22.5 in all 
cases. (e)  f denotes category omitted in estimation. (f) ***, ** and * denote respectively statistical significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels using two-tailed tests. Source: LSMS 2002, 2007. 
 
We now turn attention to examining the more important factors that determine the 
level of labour market earnings inequality as reported in Table 6. The first point to   12
note is that although the fits of the estimated equations are respectable (table 5), a 
considerable amount of the total variation in log monthly earnings in both years is 
unexplained by the wage determining factors.  The residual components, though 
declining, are sizeable and most of the inequality is thus unexplained.
12  T h e r e  
remains a great deal of noise in the wage determination process in Serbia and 
unobservable factors appear to dominate the process.  In terms of the explained 
component, however, Table 6 identifies educational qualifications, as the most 
important factor, which accounts for 43 per cent and 50 per cent of the explained level 
of inequality in 2002 and 2007 respectively. The second important factor in 2002 is 
arrears, accounting for around a quarter of explained level of inequality, but its 
importance diminished in 2007. In 2007 however, the second most important factor in 
explaining the level of earnings inequality is the informal sector, while its role in 2002 
was minimal. In addition to those factors, region plays an important role as well, in 
both years considered. Other factors, such as gender, labour force experience, marital 
status, settlement type and monthly hours worked played a negligible role in 
explaining the level of earnings inequality in Serbia.  
 
Table 6. Factor inequality shares for monthly earnings, 2002 and 2007 
Factors 2002  2007 
Male 0.0205  0.0151 
Work experience  0.0021  0.0138 
Education 0.1151  0.1908 
Marital status  0.0046  0.0018 
Industry 0.0027  0.0320 
Informal sector  -0.0006  0.0487 
Urban 0.0041  0.0109 
Region 0.0349  0.0327 
Arrears 0.0686  0.0135 
Hours (log)  0.0168  0.0253 
Residual 0.7311  0.6153 
Sample size  4257  3795 
Notes: The calculations are based on expression [3] in the text. 
Source: LSMS 2002, 2007. 
 
Table 7 provides further insights into the change in inequality using expression [5], as 
it isolates the changing factors that drive the differences in earnings inequality 
between 2002 and 2007.  In this exercise we use the Gini, the Theil entropy measure 
and the variance of log wages as the dispersion measures. Given the marginal increase 
in earnings inequality between 2002 and 2007, a positive (negative) sign indicates 
factors responsible for widening (narrowing) earnings inequality. It is comforting that 
there is a consensus across almost all measures regarding the directional effect the 
factors exert on inequality.  Both education and the informal sector are found to exert 
a widening influence on inequality. (The role of the informal economy in changing 
inequality will be further analysed in the following sub-section.) An increase in wage 
premiums to education is also found to be one of the most important factors that were 
driving the rise in wage disparities in the Central European countries (World Bank, 
2000). However, the relative importance of these factors appears to be sensitive to the 
inequality measure used.  The one factor that acts to narrow earnings inequality is 
employee arrears, due to the reduction in arrears. The share of employees with arrears 
                                                 
12 This is not uncommon for transitional economies. See Newell and Reilly (1999) for wage equation 
fits for a selection of transitional economies.   13
declined from 18.4 percent in 2002 to 2.8 percent in 2007. A similar feature was 
observed in Russia and other CIS countries, where reduction in arrears explains the 
decline in inequality among wage earners (Alam et al., 2005; Rutkowski et al., 2005).  
 
Table 7. Contribution of factors to changes in monthly earnings inequality, 2002-2007 
Factors  Theil entropy measure  Gini  Variance of logs 
Male -0.0724  -0.0692  -0.0188 
Work experience  0.2033  0.1965  0.0873 
Education 1.4169  1.3732  0.6663 
Marital status  -0.0436  -0.0419  -0.0158 
Industry 0.5066  0.4897  0.2160 
Informal sector  0.8472  0.8187  0.3584 
Urban 0.1210  0.1171  0.0536 
Region -0.0029  -0.0017  0.0189 
Arrears -0.8790  -0.8471  -0.3326 
Hours (log)  0.1630  0.1581  0.0787 
Residual -1.2603  -1.1934  -0.1121 
Notes: The calculations are based on expression [5] in the text. 
Source: LSMS 2002, 2007. 
 
 
5.3. Informality as a factor that determines the level and change in earnings 
inequality  
 
Although employment in the informal economy did not have any influence on 
earnings inequality in 2002, it was the second most important factor, after education, 
in explaining the level of earnings inequality in 2007. This is in line with the 
estimated earnings regression results which show that informal sector variable was 
not significant in 2002, but highly significant in 2007. Table 6 shows that informal 
sector contributed to around 13 percent of explained level of inequality in 2007. This 
widening influence on earnings inequality could be linked to the increased share of 
employees working informally between the two years in question. A similar feature is 
observed in many transition countries, where the increased share of temporary or 
short term contracts is seen as a factor contributing to rising earnings inequality 
(Alam et al., 2005).  
 
As noted earlier, the share of employees (i.e. in wage employment) working in the 
informal economy in Serbia increased considerably, from 11 per cent to 20 per cent 
over 2002-2007. This is mainly driven by the increased share of those who did not 
pay social security contributions. It appears that reforms on labour taxes and social 
security contributions, introduced at the beginning of 2007, did not bring a visible 
reduction in informal employment and an increase in formal employment, although 
the average fiscal burden of employees’ net salaries decreased from 73 per cent to 62 
per cent (Krstić and Corbanese, 2009).  
 
There is no doubt that Serbia made significant progresses in the improvement of the 
business climate over the years considered, as numerous surveys indicate. However, 
the World Bank’s Doing Business 2009 (World Bank, 2008) indicators show that 
Serbia continues to score poorly in some of the areas studied, particularly in the area 
of paying taxes and starting a new business. Policy-makers therefore need to re-
double efforts to simplify the tax system and ensure firms and workers have an   14
incentive to register and operate within formal structures. Formalization may be 




6. Conclusion and policy implications  
 
This paper has attempted to identify the importance of informal economy in 
describing the level of main job earnings inequality within a given year and the 
change in that inequality between 2002 and 2007. The paper spans the period of 
significant transition-related reforms with substantial progress made in the 
improvement of the business climate. The availability of new, high-quality LSMS 
data and applied regression-based methodology have allowed us to draw a number of 
important conclusions regarding informality and inequality in the Serbian labour 
market.  
 
Our analysis revealed that informal activities are highly significant in the Serbian 
labour market, and appear to have grown considerably over 2002-2007. Nearly 28 
percent of total employment (aged 15-64) was in the informal sector in 2002, and this 
percentage increased to 35 percent in 2007.  This is a counter-intuitive result, but can 
be explained by number of factors. One possible reason is the regressiveness of the 
wage taxation system that was present since 2001 until 1 January 2007. By imposing 
a high tax burden on low-income labour, the incentives for employees to join the 
formal economy diminishes, as they have to give up a significant portion of what they 
can get working at the same job informally. It appears that reforms on labour taxes 
and social security contributions introduced at the beginning of 2007, have not yet 
bring a visible reduction in informal employment although the average fiscal burden 
of employees’ net salaries decreased significantly. Informal employment was until 
recently also encouraged by the ease in gaining access to a range of social benefits 
through the simple act of registering as unemployed with the employment service, 
while actually working in the informal economy.  
 
A second result of interest is that the level of inequality appears to have remained 
broadly constant over the period in question, both for formal earnings and in the 
informal sector, where inequality is particularly pronounced, although some increase 
has occurred. This is a surprising result, especially in light of the rise in informal 
activities and the enhanced role of education. Relatively stable earnings inequality in 
Serbia appears in contrast to findings of Milanović (1998) for other selected 
transitional economies where a positive relationship between reform and inequality is 
detected. Other studies also show that most transition countries experienced large 
increase in earnings inequality since the transition began (World Bank, 2000). The 
sharp decline in arrears over the period in question has helped to counteract those 
forces pushing in the direction of greater inequality. 
 
Finally, the analysis identifies informality as an important determinant of inequality in 
2007, but not in 2002. Informal sector is found to exert a widening influence on 
earnings inequality, which could be linked to increased share of employees working 
informally between two years in question. However, the most important factor that 
explains both the level of explained inequality in 2002 and 2007, and contributed to 
slightly increased inequality over that period, appears to be educational qualification.   15
An increase in wage premiums to education is also found to be the most important 
factors that were driving the rise in wage disparities in the Central European countries 
(World Bank, 2000). 
 
The results highlight two points that need to be addressed by policy makers. First, 
measures taken so far to reduce informality have been a failure. Even though the 
economy has grown strongly over the present decade, the level of informality has 
increased, implying both unfair competition to those in the formal sector who are 
subject to the usual taxes and regulation, and a loss of much-needed revenue to the 
government. The paper provides evidence that many still find it relatively easy to 
register as unemployed but continue to work in the informal sector. The recent 
changes (noted above) on access to health insurance and other benefits should help to 
improve the situation, but continued vigilance will be needed to ensure that social 
assistance is targeted at the most needy.  
 
Second, the returns to education have increased over the period. This is an 
encouraging result in that it brings out the benefits of a greater focus on educational 
attainment and suggests that the benefits to expending greater resources on schools 
and universities may be higher than before. Recent research has once again 
highlighted the strong link between educational attainment and economic growth, 
particularly in transition countries (see EBRD, 2008), and points to the need for 
greater government spending in this area. 
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Annex: 
Table A1. Average monthly and hourly main job earnings and hours worked, 2002-2007   
 2002  2007 
Average monthly net main job earnings, in dinars*  9,172.3 22,659.0 
Informal 9,370.6  16,647.5 
Formal   9,148.0  24,067.3 
    
Average monthly hours worked**  168.3 169.7 
Informal 167.2  157.6 
Formal   168.4  172.5 
    
Average hourly net main job earnings, in dinars  62.4 203.5 
Informal 73.1  200.6 
Formal   61.1  204.2 
Notes: Sample relate to employees aged 15-64 years. * For those who reported positive hours worked. 
**For those who reported positive monthly wages. 
Source: LSMS 2002, 2007.   17
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